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Student Loans as Taxes
By John R. Brooks
The growth of college tuition and the corre-
sponding rise in student loan debt have become
major issues of public importance. Total outstand-
ing student debt is at least $1.3 trillion,1 and tuitions
keep growing, even while we arguably need to
invest more in higher education to add skills and
grow our economy.2 Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., has
made higher education reform a major part of his
Democratic presidential campaign platform, pro-
posing a new financial transactions tax to pay for
large grants to states that offer free tuition to public
universities.3 His opponent, Hillary Clinton, has
proposed grants to states to offer ‘‘no-debt-tuition,’’
paid for in part by repealing several tax expendi-
tures.4 These and other plans would essentially
increase federal spending on higher education
through expanded progressive taxation.
However, somewhat lost in all the noise around
these problems and proposals is the fact that, to a
large degree, college and graduate school tuition is
already paid for through a system of progressive
taxation. We just don’t call it that. Instead, we call it
income-driven repayment of student loans.
Since 2012 any federal student loan borrower can
choose to pay no more than 10 percent of discre-
tionary income,5 and after a maximum of 25 years,
any remaining loan balance is forgiven. Thus, the
government is paying for a service — in this case
higher education tuition — and financing that pay-
ment by collecting a percentage of graduates’ in-
come. Normally, we would call that an income tax
to pay for government benefits, but because it is
cloaked as a loan, its tax-like nature is somewhat
opaque. But we should still recognize it for what it
is. One could imagine Sanders embracing a plan to
pay for tuition with an income surtax on higher-
income graduates. The fact that we call it paying
back a loan shouldn’t change that.
Income-Driven Repayment
Options for income-driven repayment of student
loans have been around for a while but have only
recently become generous enough to make a differ-
ence. An early program, called Income-Contingent
Repayment (ICR), was established back in 1993.6 It
limited borrowers’ monthly payments to no more
than 20 percent of ‘‘discretionary income,’’ which
was defined as income that exceeded 150 percent of
the relevant poverty line.7 After 25 years, any
remaining loan balance was forgiven. This program
had very low uptake, however, likely because of
these relatively ungenerous terms.8
1See Federal Reserve, ‘‘Statistical Release G.19, Consumer
Credit’’ (Feb. 2016). Of the $1.3 trillion, roughly $1.2 trillion is
from the federal government, either as direct loans or as
guaranteed private loans under the old Federal Family Educa-
tion Loan program. See Federal Student Aid, ‘‘Federal Student
Aid Portfolio Summary,’’ Department of Education.
2See, e.g., Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, The Race
Between Education and Technology (2008).
3See College for All Act, S. 1373, 114th Congress (introduced
May 19, 2015).
4See ‘‘College Compact: Costs Won’t Be a Barrier, Hillary for
America’’ (2015); and Patrick Healy, ‘‘Hillary Clinton to Offer
Plan on Paying College Tuition Without Needing Loans,’’ The
New York Times, Aug. 10, 2015.
5Discretionary income is adjusted gross income less 150
percent of the relevant poverty line. See 34 C.F.R. sections
685.209(a)(1)(v) and 685.221(a)(5).
6See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L. 103-66,
section 4021, 107 Stat. 312, 341-354 (1993). For the history around
ICR, see Philip G. Schrag, ‘‘The Federal Income-Contingent
Repayment Option for Law Student Loans,’’ 29 Hofstra L. Rev.
733, 764-774 (2001).
7See 20 U.S.C. section 1078(b)(9)(A)(iv); and 34 C.F.R. section
685.209(b).
8As of this writing, only about 600,000 borrowers are in ICR,
compared with nearly 4 million in the other income-driven
plans. See Federal Student Aid, ‘‘Direct Loan Portfolio by
Repayment Plan,’’ Department of Education.
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In 2007 Congress created the Income-Based Re-
payment (Old IBR) program, which called for pay-
ments of 15 percent of discretionary income, with
loan forgiveness after 25 years.9 Recognizing that
this still was not generous enough, in the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
(which also enacted Obamacare), Congress lowered
the payments to 10 percent of discretionary income,
with forgiveness after 20 years (New IBR).10 Impor-
tantly, the 2010 bill also effectively nationalized the
federal student loan program.11 After 2010 all fed-
eral student loans are issued directly by the Educa-
tion Department, rather than by subsidized private
lenders. Pre-2010 Stafford loans were still essen-
tially government loans, but this expansion of the
Direct Loan program made explicit that the funds to
pay for tuition are coming straight from the federal
government — just as they would if the federal
government simply paid the schools directly.
While the less generous Old IBR applies to all
borrowers, the New IBR applies only to people who
are new borrowers after July 1, 2014.12 But the
Obama administration decided to accelerate things.
Using its authority under the older ICR program,
the Education Department issued regulations creat-
ing yet another program — Pay As You Earn (PAYE)
— and made it available to those who were new
borrowers as of October 1, 2007, provided they
received a loan disbursement after October 1,
2011.13 PAYE roughly mimicked New IBR — pay-
ment of 10 percent of discretionary income, forgive-
ness after 20 years — but was available by 2012
rather than 2014. One big difference, however, is in
the treatment of unpaid interest. PAYE is much
more generous to borrowers than IBR because it
caps any capitalized interest at 10 percent of the
original loan balance.14 In confusing Education
Department-speak, unpaid interest would continue
to accrue after that point, but it would not be
capitalized, meaning that the borrower is not
charged interest on any unpaid interest beyond that
10 percent. That’s a substantial benefit over a 20-
year period because loan interest rates can be 5
percent or higher.
IBR and PAYE faced some criticism, however,
especially for being too generous to borrowers for
graduate school and for allowing married couples
who filed taxes separately to calculate payments
based on their individual, rather than combined,
incomes.15 I address some of these criticisms below
when I discuss why these programs should be
thought of like tax programs. But the Obama ad-
ministration responded to these criticisms by add-
ing yet another to the alphabet soup of student loan
programs — the Revised Pay As You Earn (RE-
PAYE) program — which came into effect in 2015.16
The key differences between PAYE and REPAYE
are that REPAYE is available to borrowers with debt
from before 2007;17 combines income for married
couples filing taxes separately;18 has even more
generous treatment of interest;19 extends the repay-
ment period from 20 to 25 years for anyone with
graduate school debt;20 and — this is key — re-
quires payment of 10 percent of discretionary in-
come no matter how high the borrower’s income.21 This
is in contrast to the other programs, which cap
payments at the standard 10-year loan service pay-
ment once a borrower’s income gets sufficiently
high.22 Removing that cap makes REPAYE progres-
sive in the same way that our tax system is, at least
on paper. For example, suppose a lawyer enters
REPAYE while working as a government lawyer
but then later joins a New York law firm as a partner
making $500,000 annually. In her first year in the
new job, she could owe as much as $48,000.23 That
would be a remarkable event, although as I discuss
below, I have some doubts about whether this will
actually happen. But the design choice is nonethe-
less revealing — requiring that level of payment
dramatically distinguishes REPAYE from a typical
loan.
9College Cost Reduction and Access Act, P.L. 110-84, section
203, 121 Stat. 784, 792-795 (2007); 20 U.S.C. section 1098e; and 34
C.F.R. section 685.221(b).
10See P.L. 111-152, section 2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1081 (2010); 20
U.S.C. section 1098e(e); and 34 C.F.R. section 685.221(b) (regard-
ing ‘‘new borrowers’’).
11See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
sections 2201-2213, 124 Stat. at 1074-1081.
12See 20 U.S.C. section 1098e(e).
13See 34 C.F.R. section 685.209(a)(1)(iii).
14Id. at sections 685.221(b)(4) (IBR interest rules) and
685.209(a)(2)(iv) (PAYE interest rules). Under both IBR and
PAYE, unpaid interest on subsidized loans is not charged for the
first three years. See id. at sections 685.209(a)(2)(iii) (IBR) and
685.221(b)(3) (PAYE).
15See, e.g., Jason Delisle and Alex Holt, ‘‘Safety Net or
Windfall?: Examining Changes to Income-Based Repayment for
Federal Student Loans,’’ New American Foundation (2012), at
11-12.
16See 34 C.F.R. section 685.209(c).
17Id. at section 685.209(c)(1)(ii).
18Id. at section 685.209(c)(1)(i).
19If the borrower’s monthly payment is not sufficient to
cover the accrued interest, only half of the otherwise due
interest payment is charged. Id. at section 685.209(c)(2)(iii).
20Id. at section 685.209(c)(5)(ii).
21Id. at section 685.209(c)(2)(i).
22See id. at sections 685.209(a)(4)(i) (cap for PAYE) and
685.221(d)(1)(i) (cap for IBR).
23This is assuming AGI of $500,000 and using the 2015
poverty level for a single-person household of $11,770. It is also
assuming that she has outstanding debt of at least $48,000,
because she would not pay any more than what she owed.
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Two final points to add. First, those programs are
available to any borrower, regardless of career. That
is in contrast to Public Service Loan Forgiveness
(PSLF), which is available only to borrowers work-
ing in government or public services.24 PSLF offers
the same income-driven payment schedule but for-
gives outstanding debt after only 10 years, rather
than 20 or 25 years. Second, the loan forgiveness
under IBR, PAYE, etc., creates discharge of indebt-
edness income for tax purposes, at least as of now.25
That is in contrast to PSLF, for which there is an
exclusion from income under section 108.26 The tax
inclusion essentially means that not all of the debt is
forgiven. The White House has repeatedly called on
Congress to provide an exclusion.27
Loans as Taxes
We can all agree (I hope) that whether or not
something is named a ‘‘tax’’ is not the end of the
story. After all, tax expenditure analysis relies on the
idea that specific tax provisions are not really tax
provisions at all but are actually spending provi-
sions. If we extend that logic, there are likely many
things that operate like taxes but fall under a
different name. A simple example would be the
penalty for failure to purchase health insurance
under the Affordable Care Act. While deliberately
not labeled as a ‘‘tax,’’ the Supreme Court nonethe-
less found that it was, at least for purposes of the
congressional power to enact the penalty.28
My claim here is that, at least as a first approxi-
mation, income-driven repayment of federal stu-
dent loans looks a lot like an income tax to fund
government spending.29 Government money pays a
portion of the cost of educating students (in the
form of a loan disbursement), and the money to pay
for it is raised from a levy on graduates’ income (in
the form of an income-driven payment). Whether
we call the levy a loan service payment or a tax
doesn’t change the fact that a percentage of indi-
viduals’ income is being used to fund a government
benefit (federal loans being essentially available to
anyone). Moreover, the combination of the income-
driven payment, the forgiveness schedule, and the
interest forbearance generate a degree of progres-
sivity in the program — full payers are subsidizing
those in partial financial hardship, especially if
some loan balances are forgiven. While perhaps not
as progressive as the income tax, we still end up
with a form of progressive and collective payment
for some higher education costs.
Just to underscore this point, Australia has a very
similar program to finance tuition costs, and it
collects the loan payments through the tax system
— the loan payment is essentially another line on a
tax return.30
That said, there are obviously some key differ-
ences between what we could call a true ‘‘graduate
tax’’ and income-driven repayment of a student
loan. First, for all of the programs except REPAYE,
the borrowers do not pay a percentage of income at
all income levels. The payments are capped at the
standard 10-year loan service payment, so once a
borrower’s income gets high enough, she goes back
to just paying a flat loan payment. Thus, the pay-
ment schedule is progressive for lower income
levels but then regressive for higher income levels.31
REPAYE, by contrast, removes that cap and has
borrowers pay 10 percent of income at all levels.
Second, borrowers pay only until the loan bal-
ance is paid off (or until the loan is forgiven after 20
or 25 years, or 10 years for those in PSLF). A true tax
would presumably be due for life. As I discuss
below, that complicates the administration’s desire
to have high-income graduates pay more under
REPAYE.
Third, a tax-financed system would be funded by
all taxpayers. Student loans, by contrast, are dispro-
portionately funded by former students. High-
income graduates will pay their full costs and then
some, because of relatively high interest rates, and
the excess will partly fund the forbearance and
forgiveness for low-income graduates. However,
some of the funds will also come from taxpayers
generally. Right now, the government estimates that
taxpayers will end up paying about $22 billion to
cover forgiveness on outstanding loans.32 That
sounds like a lot, but that’s about one year’s worth
of Pell grants to cover several years’ worth of
loans.33
24See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, 34 C.F.R.
section 685.219(c).
25See, e.g., Ron Lieber, ‘‘For Student Borrowers, Relief Now
May Mean a Big Tax Bill Later,’’ The New York Times, Dec. 14,
2012.
26Section 108(f).
27See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, ‘‘Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2014’’ (Apr. 2013), at 209;
OMB, ‘‘Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2015’’ (Mar. 2014), at 190; and OMB, ‘‘Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2016’’ (Feb. 2015), at 53.
28See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-2597 (2012).
29I elaborate on this point and discuss it more fully in John R.
Brooks, ‘‘Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing
of Higher Education,’’ 104 Geo. L.J. 229 (2016).
30See id. at 275-277.
31See id. at 260-261.
32See Education Department, ‘‘Student Loans Overview, Fis-
cal Year 2016 Budget Proposal’’ (2015), at R-10 to R-12.
33See Congressional Budget Office, ‘‘Program Costs Assum-
ing a Maximum Discretionary Award Level of $4,860 in the
Federal Pell Grant Program — CBO’s April 2014 Baseline’’
(2014) (projecting outlays of $26.4 billion for Pell Grants in 2014).
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These are important caveats, to be sure. But if we
can’t call income-driven repayment a pure tax, we
certainly can’t call it a pure loan either. The combi-
nation of income-based repayment and loan for-
giveness means that for many students, the nominal
debt amount and nominal interest rates are irrel-
evant — all that matters is their income. It’s hard to
think of that as actually a loan.
Reforms to the Income-Driven Repayment
Framing PAYE, REPAYE, and the rest as tax-like
programs suggests some problems and reforms that
don’t usually come up in discussions about student
loans. This is largely because the current debate still
sees the loans as fundamentally loans. But my claim
here is that a loan that requires payment only as a
function of income, includes substantial interest
relief, and can be ultimately forgiven in total, isn’t
much of a loan anymore — or is at least different
enough that the usual criticisms don’t apply.
For example, one typical criticism of student
loans is that interest rates are too high. High interest
is said to be a burden on low-income graduates and
also gives the appearance of the government prof-
iting off of debt-ridden students. Leaving aside
whether the interest rates are fair in risk-adjusted
terms, if we see the loan payments more like taxes,
the problem is actually that the interest rates are too
low. With income-driven payments, interest relief,
and potential forgiveness, the only people who
should care about the nominal interest rates are
relatively-high-income graduates — but, under this
model, they are precisely the ones who should be
paying to support the low-income graduates, who
in turn shouldn’t really care that much about the
nominal interest rate. If high-income graduates
aren’t asked to pay more, the costs instead land on
taxpayers in general, and it’s not clear that that
would be fairer. After all, high-income graduates
are the ones getting a huge benefit from the educa-
tion the loan paid for.
Another typical criticism is that students are
taking on too much debt. But if a federal student
loan is just an accounting device to manage a
tax-financed government benefit, the bigger pro-
gram is that the loans are too small, at least for
undergraduate education.34 The income-driven re-
payment model is available only for federal Direct
Loans to students. But undergraduates can borrow
a maximum of only $57,000, and most can borrow
only $27,000 — that’s the total for four years of
school for a dependent student.35 In-state public
university tuition, room, and board averages
$14,120 per year, net of all other grants and tax
credits,36 so federal loans can cover only about half
of average out-of-pocket costs.
To make up the gap, a student might be forced to
take out private loans, which have high interest, no
income-based payments, and no forgiveness (and
are not dischargeable in bankruptcy). So the rela-
tively low cap on federal student loans may force
some students to take on more of exactly the kind of
debt that student loan critics hate. In contrast,
raising the cap will allow students to take greater
advantage of the generous benefits of income-
driven repayment.
A tax frame also helps to see that the administra-
tion’s laudable goal of having high-income gradu-
ates pay more — by asking all borrowers to pay 10
percent of their income under REPAYE, no matter
their income level — will actually be counterpro-
ductive as currently structured. I support a progres-
sive system of higher education funding, including
one that asks high-income graduates to pay more,
but as long as borrowers pay only until the loan
balance is paid off (or is forgiven), higher monthly
payment simply accelerate payments rather than
increase them over the life cycle. And with loan
interest rates higher than the risk-free rate, that
could mean that high-income taxpayers actually
end up paying less in present value terms than they
would with more level payments.
The only students who end up paying more
under REPAYE’s payment schedule are those who
would otherwise have had some loan forgiveness.
Consider our lawyer from the earlier example, who
has low income for the first 10 years of loan
repayment, and thus pays relatively little under
REPAYE, but then has high income for the next 10
years. If that person just made the standard loan
service payment for those second 10 years, it’s
possible that there would still be a loan balance
after 20 years, which would be forgiven. But with
payments of $48,000 per year or higher, she would
likely end up paying off the full balance instead. In
that case, accelerating payments would actually
increase the total paid. That would be a worthwhile
goal. The catch, however, is that it’s also relatively
easy to switch out of REPAYE entirely and back to
the standard repayment plan.37 So even those bor-
rowers probably won’t be hit by the higher pay-
ments.
34See Brooks and Jonathan D. Glater, ‘‘Raise the Cap on
Federal Student Loans,’’ Los Angeles Times, Aug. 3, 2015.
35See Federal Student Aid, ‘‘Federal Student Aid, Subsidized
and Unsubsidized Loans,’’ Department of Education (2016).
36See College Board, ‘‘Trends in College Pricing 2015’’ (2015),
at 23.
37See 34 C.F.R. section 685.209(c)(2)(vi) (‘‘A borrower who no
longer wishes to repay under the REPAYE plan may change to
a different repayment plan in accordance with section
687.210(b).’’).
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For this to work — to make student debt pay-
ments progressive at all income levels over the life
cycle — the government would probably have to lift
the lifetime payment cap. That is, high-income
borrowers would have to pay more than the nomi-
nal amount borrowed plus interest, such as 10
percent of discretionary income for a minimum
number of years or based on some other factor.
Then requiring higher monthly payments wouldn’t
just accelerate payment but would actually increase
it.
Asking high-income graduates to pay more than
they borrowed plus interest may sound unfair —
but it is no less fair than asking high-income
individuals to pay more in income taxes than they
receive in benefits. But it could raise adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard, and other design issues. Yale
University tried a similar program for a few years in
the 1970s, called the Tuition Postponement Option
(TPO). Under that program, borrowers were asked
to pay a percentage of their income until all of a
given class’s debt was paid, or for 35 years, which-
ever occurred first.38 TPO didn’t work out so well,
however. By 1999 no class had fully paid off its debt,
and Yale, under pressure from alumni, canceled the
remaining debt.39
Purdue University has recently instituted a simi-
lar program, although payments are for a fixed
number of years without connection to a class’s
overall debt,40 and Oregon and several other states
have proposed programs.41 While potentially prom-
ising, school- and state-based programs could face
major moral hazard (especially from out-migration)
and adverse selection (if those anticipating high
income can opt out) problems. Just as with an
income tax, there are good fiscal federalism argu-
ments for this sort of policy instrument to be
implemented at the national, rather than state, level.
Another odd difference between PAYE and
REPAYE is the treatment of graduate school debt.
Early criticism of IBR focused on how it could be
particularly generous to borrowers for graduate
degrees, especially professional degrees like law
and medicine, and thus could end up having a
regressive effect.42 So REPAYE extends the repay-
ment period for anyone with graduate debt from 20
years to 25 years. From a design standpoint, that’s
an unfortunate cliff: taking on even $1 of debt for
graduate school means five more years of payment
for all debt, including undergraduate debt. That
could cause people to delay graduate school or even
forgo it entirely.
But it’s also not clear that the payment schedule
is the problem. The relative generosity for graduate
students comes from the fact that a graduate stu-
dent can borrow up to the full cost of attendance
using debt eligible for income-driven repayment,43
while an undergraduate can borrow at most $57,000
over all school years, and most will be able to
borrow only $27,000.44 So, for example, a dependent
undergraduate can borrow from the federal govern-
ment at most $7,500 for his third or fourth year of
college.45 However, a student at, say, Harvard Law
School, could borrow up to $88,700 per year in
federal loans eligible for income-driven repay-
ment.46 Therefore, it shouldn’t be a surprise that the
loan benefits are skewed toward graduate students.
As noted above, the caps on undergraduate debt
should be raised, but we should also remember that
undergraduates get other forms of aid — like
institutional grants, Pell grants, and the like. Just
singling out the benefits to graduate students under
income-driven repayment ignores the bigger pic-
ture of all federal aid.
Conclusion
Reforms to the federal student loan program
have been a major policy innovation of the Obama
administration. Unlike healthcare and financial re-
form, however, they have been somewhat under the
radar. More students are starting to learn about the
benefits of income-driven repayment, but the pro-
grams are still often thought of as incremental
reforms to ease the burden of repayment, rather
than as a dramatic change to the financing of higher
education.
However, if widely adopted, the income-driven
repayment programs like IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE
could move tuition spending from being largely
38See Brooks, supra note 29, at 274-275; and William E.
Curran, ‘‘Yale’s Tuition Postponement Option,’’ 2 J.L. & Educ.
283, 285 (1973).
39‘‘Yale to Erase Alumni Debts in 2 Loan Plans,’’ The New York
Times, Apr. 13, 1999.
40See Stacy Cowley, ‘‘Getting a Student Loan With Collateral
From a Future Job,’’ The New York Times, Apr. 8, 2016.
41See Brooks, supra note 29, at 277-279; Steven Dubois, ‘‘Plan
Would Make Tuition Free at Ore. Colleges,’’ Yahoo! News, July
4, 2013; and Julia Lawrence, ‘‘First Oregon, Now Ohio Looking
at ‘Pay It Forward’ Tuition Plan,’’ Education News, July 22,
2013.
42See supra note 15.
43Graduate students can take out Direct PLUS loans for the
full cost of attendance, 34 C.F.R. section 685.203(f)-(g), and these
loans are eligible for the various income-driven repayment
programs, 34 C.F.R. section 685.209(a)(1)(ii) (limiting the exclu-
sion of Direct PLUS loans only to those made to a parent, not a
student directly). See also Federal Student Aid, ‘‘PLUS Loans,’’
Education Department.
44See supra note 35.
45Id.
46See Harvard Law School, ‘‘Cost of Attendance’’ (2016).
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debt-financed private spending toward being pro-
gressive and collective public spending, akin to a
tax-financed government spending program. That
is a dramatic change for a big sector of our economy
and a big piece of household spending.
But to truly work as a progressive and collective
method of financing higher education, several re-
forms would be necessary. The borrowing cap for
undergraduates would have to increase and likely
the lifetime payment cap as well. To deal with
adverse selection and arbitrage between different
payment programs (and complexity in general), the
government should also institute a single income-
driven repayment plan and consider making it
mandatory for all borrowers.47 While reforms like
these won’t solve every problem with higher edu-
cation funding — and could introduce new chal-
lenges — they would go a long way toward true
federal public funding of higher education.
47For more, see Brooks, supra note 29, at 279-286.
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